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RECENT CASES
Banks and Banking-Night Deposit-Relation of Bank and Depositor-Plaintiffs, wishing to make a night deposit, placed money, a
check, a deposit slip, and a pass-book in a canvas bag provided by defendant bank. The depository was unlocked and the bag inserted. Plaintiffs
received no credit for the deposit. When it appeared that the bag had
been lost before its contents had been removed, plaintiffs sued to recover
the amount in the bag. Appeal from judgment for plaintiffs. Held, judgment affirmed. The relation between a bank and a night depositor is a
bailment for mutual benefit at least until the funds are removed from the
bag, and the bailee bank is required to use reasonable care in seeing that
the depositor's account is credited. Bernstein v. Northwestern Nationdl
Bank, 41 A. (2d) 44o (Pa. Super. 1945).

A novel problem in legal relationships such as is presented by the
instant case seems most wisely solved by considering to what alreadydetermined legal relation the facts are most analogous and by adopting the
rights and duties to which that relation gives rise, unless there is some
compelling reason for not so doing. Only in this way are decisions in novel
cases protected against arbitrariness. The apparently basic question which
the court did not offer to answer is, At what point when money is passed
through a teller's window by a depositor does the relation of debtor and
creditor come into existence?' While agreement is not complete, the general rule appears to be that delivery of the funds with a deposit slip into
the possession of an officer of the bank is sufficient to pass title to the bank,
creating the relation of debtor and creditor.2 The term "night depository"
is actually a misnomer, for the device may be used at all times. The
delivery of funds through this device-the funds coming into the possession
of the bank with the same intention as though they had been passed through
the teller's window-seems to such an extent analogous to the latter transaction that similar legal rights and duties should follow. It is not logical
to say that a person who, during banking hours, chooses to make use of
the depository device stands in an entirely different relation to the bank
than a person who enters and passes his money through a window. What
the bank is actually doing is extending its hours of business for receiving
i. When should the relation of debtor-creditor arise?

the books _Pf the bank or in the depositor's pass-book?

Only after an entry upon

Or only after the money has

been commingled with other funds of the bank? When a receipted deposit slip has

been returned? After the money has been counted by the teller? Or as soon as it
comes into the possession of the teller?
2. "The teller takes the money with the deposit slip. Then the deposit is complete." ZANE, THE LAW OF BANKS AND BANKING (1900) § 131. "The term 'deposit'
when used in connection with a banking transaction, denotes a contractual relationship
ensuing from the delivery, by one known as a 'depositor,' of moneys, funds, or things
into the possession of the bank. . . ." 7 Amf. Jua. (1937) § 405 and cases cited
therein. "A deposit is complete when it passes from the possession of the depositor
into the hands and into the possession of the agent of the bank. . . " MAGEE, A
TREATisE ON THE LAW OF NATIONAL AND STATE BANKS (3d ed. 1921) § 170. I
MORsE, A TREATIsE ON THE LAW OF BANKS AND BANKING (6th ed. 1928) § 179. But
cf. Wasson v. Lamb, 120 Ind. 514, 22 N. E. 729 (1889) (debtor-creditor relation not

established until deposit is entered in pass-book) ; Bassett v. City Bank and Trust Co.,
115 Conn. I, I6o Atl. 6o (1932) (deposit made when cash was handed to teller with
deposit slip and placed with other funds; deposit need never be entered on the books
of the bank) ; In re Ruskay, 5 F. (2d) 143 (1925) (relationship of debtor-creditor
created though deposit was after business hours and not credited on the bank's books

until the following day).
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deposits by providing the depository chute and safe as it provides the
window and the teller.3 Any question of the presence of consent to accept
the funds for deposit may be answered by saying that the bank in offering4
the service expressed by that "unequivocal act" such consent in advance.
Thus, intent to have title pass is identical in both situations. Certainly the
bank has complete possession and the right to commingle the funds. It
should not matter whether or not it exercises that right to commingle. The
analogy of a deposit made through the teller's window to the facts of the
instant case appears clear and should govern, deciding the rights and remedies here. The effect of the court's decision is to introduce the additional
and unnecessary complication of the bailment relation into every deposit
transaction, establishing, even in the case of manual delivery to the teller,
a temporary bailment until some undetermined point in the process of
commingling the money with other bank funds. 5 To lawyers such a decision might not be surprising. But it is well to guard against legal rules
which tend to make the law appear to laymen as no more than a bag of
tricks.

Patents-Inventor's Right to Protection for SubcombinationPlaintiff brought a suit in equity under R. S. § 4915 to compel issuance
of a patent upon a subcombination of the elements of a machine for split'ting, peeling, and coring pears. The Patent Office had allowed claims covering the machine as a whole but refused the petitioner's claims on the
subcombination, namely, the whole machine minus the splitting knife. A
patent on the subcombination was sought in order to prevent infringing
of a portion of the invention which by itself was valuable. The Court of
Appeals sustained the ruling of the Patent Office by holding, in effect, that
the issuance of patents on a subcombination does not come within the Constitutional provision that the patent law must promote science and the
useful arts.1 In reversing this ruling the United States Supreme Court
held (four justices dissenting) ,2 that a subcombination may be patented
despite the fact that the prospective patentee does not intend to exploit the
subcombination as such, provided there is no purpose to enlarge the
monopoly of either invention. Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 65 Sup. Ct.
741, 89 L. Ed. (Allv. Ops.) 726 (i945).
The views expressed by the majority of the court in upholding an
inventor's right to a monopoly of his invention, and the Court of Appeals
in substantially advocating free use of inventions by the public, indicate the
presence of two conflicting economic views regarding patents. The Con3. "The purpose . . . was to have the funds reach the teller by a mechanical con-

duit precisely the same as if the deposit6r walked into the bank and personally handed

it to the teller." Brief for Appellees, p. i, 41 A. (2d) 44o (Pa. Super. 1945).
4. "Some unequivocal act by the bank . . . was necessary to make it a general deposit and create the status of debtor and creditor. This relationship cannot result without the consent of both parties to the transaction." 41 A. (2d) o44,441 (Pa.
Super. 1945). Why is not the act of setting up the window and teller to receive deposits a sufficient "unequivocal act"? Furthermore, the bank receives funds.upon an
agreement which is "usually a tacit one and implied . . ." 7 Am. Jun. (1937) § 405.
5. Counsel for plaintiffs made the following sound argument: "Certainly the law
cannot break up into segments a single, simple transaction of deposit and make the
fragments depend upon the various stages of processing which the bank may see fit to
go through." Brief for Appellees, p. 15, 41 A. (2d) 44o (Pa. Super. 1945).
i. Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, i44 F. (2d) 497 (1944).
2. justices Douglas, Black, Murphy, and Rutledge dissenting.
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stitution grants Congress the right to issue letters patent to promote science
and the useful arts; 3 and if the public is ultimately to benefit there must be
stimulations to induce new inventions. 4 This inducement is given by Congress through allowing the inventor exclusive rights to deal with his invention as he sees fit for a period of seventeen years.5 If the wiles of would-be
infringers are such that an inventor needs to patent a subcombination in
order to protect himself against partial infringement upon the fruits of his
labor, there should be no curtailment by "judicial legislation" unless, perhaps, the patentee seeks thereby to extend or enlarge upon the patent
monopoly of the complete machine. 6 The view taken by the Court of
Appeals would require the petitioner to show his intention was to stimulate
commercial development of the invention and further to establish that his
purpose is not to protect some other patent. But, since 1896, it has consistently been held that a patentee has no obligation to use his invention or
grant the use of it to others.7 The view expressed by the majority of the
court, in the instant case, is manifestly proper and reassuring to those who
feel that our patent system has contributed immeasurably to the industrial
development of our country.

Taxation-Basis-Sale of Stock Received in Non-Taxable Merger
-In 1939, plaintiff received shares in the Y corporation in exchange for
shares in the X corporation pursuant to a non-taxable, statutory merger.
At the time of the exchange, the transfer agent matched certificates so that
by certificate numbers particular Y shares could be traced to particular X
shares surrendered in the merger. The taxpayer had bought the X shares
in five separate blocks at different times and prices. In 1940, he sold certain Y shares which were represented by three certificates he received on
cancellation of three X certificates. Plaintiff used the cost of .the three
blocks of X stock as the basis in determining the gain or loss on the sale
of the three corresponding blocks of Y stock. The Commissioner ruled
this was not the proper basis and that plaintiff should use the cost of all his
X shares averaged with all his Y shares as the basis. The Tax Court
affirmed the Commissioner's ruling. On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals held, Tax Court reversed. The cost of the identified blocks of X
shares (not cost of all X shares averaged with all Y shares) is the correct
basis since identification of Y shares with specific X shares, whose cost is
known, is possible. Bloch v. Co nssioner of Internal Revenue, 148 F.
(2d) 452 (C. C. A. 9th, 1945).
The section of the Internal Revenue Code applicable to the instant
case declares that the basis for determining gain or loss shall be the same
3. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8.
4. See Meyers & Lewis, The Patent "Franchise"and the Antitrust Laws (1941)
30 Gao. L. J. 117, for a discussion of this problem.
5. Ray. STAT. § 4884 (1930), 35 U. S. C. A. §40.
6. Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U. S. 436, 6o Sup. Ct. 618, 84 L.
Ed. 852 (1940), limits the use of a patent monopoly from enlarging or extending the
patent monopoly of another invention.
7. Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S. 405, 28 Sup.
Ct. 748, 52 L. Ed. 1122 (19o8) ; Chapman v. Wintroath, 252 U. S. 126, 40 Sup. Ct. 234,
64 L. Ed. 491 (1920) ; Crown v. Nye Tool Works, 261 U. S. 24, 43 Sup. Ct. 254, 67
L. Ed. 516 (1923) ; Woodbridge v. United States, 263 U. S. 50, 44 Sup. Ct. 45, 68 L.
Ed. I59 (923) ; Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 52 Sup. Ct. 546, 76 L. Ed.
1010 (1932) ; Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U. S. 386, 65 Sup. Ct. 873,
89 L. Ed. (Adv. Ops.) 845 (1945).
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for property received as for the property exchanged.1 The question presented by the case, therefore, is, What has been exchanged for the particular stock sold? The taxpayer claimed that in 1939 there was an exchange wherein particular blocks of stock in the old X corporation were
exchanged for particular blocks in the new Y corporation and that identification of the shares was possible by the matching of particular X and Y
certificates. The Commissioner's view, which the court declined to accept,
was that there was an exchange of all old shares for all new shares. 2 This
would have been the usual reorganization procedure and apparently the
plan of reorganization in the instant case did not call for matching of new
stock with different blocks of the same class of old stock held by the same
owner.3 For a decade, cases have held the correct basis for determining
gain or loss on stock acquired in a reorganization exchange to be the
aggregate cost of the surrendered shares allocated equally to the new shares
received.4 While it was impossible in those cases to identify the stock sold
with any particular portion of the old stock, the rationale of those cases
indicates that identification is immaterial.5 The Arrott case holds that the
old shares all have the same exchange value and the old shares lose their
identity when traded for the new.6 The normal requirement for the issuance of stock in the new corporation is surrender of stock in the old corporation. Therefore, the cost of one new share is to be determined by
dividing the number of new shares received into the aggregate cost of all
the surrendered old shares.7 The cost of a new share ascertained by this
method will, when subtracted from the selling price of the share, produce
the exact taxable gain in the transaction. This rule, which has been adopted
i. 53 STAT. 40 (939) as amended, 26 U. S. C. A. § 113 (a) (6): "Basis (Unadjusted) of Property.-The basis of property shall be the cost of such property; except
that-(6) Tax-free exchanges generally. If the property was acquired, after February
28, 1913, upon an exchange described in section 112 (b) to (e), inclusive, the basis
(except as provided in paragraphs (I5), (I7), or (18) of this subsection) shall be the
same as in the case of the property exchanged, decreased in the amount of any money
received by the taxpayer and increased in the amount of gain or decreased in the
amount of loss to the taxpayer that was recognized upon such exchange under the law
applicable to the year in which the exchange was made...
2. "So far as the affairs of the absorbing corporation are concerned, it may be
quite right to hold, if any such issue were before us, that all of the stock put together
which is possessed by a stock holder of the absorbed corporation is surrendered for the
proper amount of stock in the absorbing corporation." 148 F. (2d) 452, 456 (C. C. A.
9th, 1945). By deciding that the issue is not before it, the court thus avoided the pertinent question of the case, i. e. whether or not the exchange was particular certificate
for particular certificate or all old shares for all new shares.
3. The reference in the stipulation of facts to the effect that the transfer agent
issued certain new certificates in lieu of certain old certificates does not state this to be
the plan of reorganization adopted. 148 F. (2d) 452, 454 (C. C. A. 9th, 1945).
4. Helvering v. Stifel, 75 F. (2d) 583 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935) ; Commissioner of Int.
Rev. v. von Gunten, 76 F. (2d) 67o (C. C. A. 6th, 1935) ; Commissioner of Int. Rev.
v. Oliver, 78 F. (2d) 561 (C. C. A. 3d, 93s5)
; Commissioner of Int. Rev. v. Bolender,
82 F. (2d) 591 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936) ; Arrott v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 136 F. (2d)
449 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943) ; Epstein v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 36 B. T. A. O9 (937) ;
Runkle v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 39 B. T. A. 458 (1939); Fleischmann v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 4o B. T. A. 672 (1)39).
5. Arrott v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 136 F. (2d) 449 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943).
"Each new share costs the taxpayer the quotient of the cost of the old shares divided
by the number of new shares he receives. If this is correct, the question of identification drops out of the operative facts in determining the value of shares received in a
tax free reorganization." Id. at 452.
6. "The old shares all have the same exchange value for the new ones no matter
what they cost the taxpayer. He gets as much new stock for the share for which he
paid $8o as he does for the share for which he paid $12o. The old shares lose their
identity when traded for the new. .

.

."

Ibid.

7. See the first sentence of note 5 supra.
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by the Tax Court s and applied in this case by that court, is fair to the
taxpayer 9 and to the Treasury. 10 The court in the instant case distinguishes four of the "average cost" basis cases on the ground noted above,
that identification is impossible. It charges that the reasoning of the
Arrott case is erroneous, but the very factor which the court considers error
appears to be a sound argument against the instant decision." The instant
decision has changed the average cost rule in the Ninth Circuit.'2 In
re-establishing uniformity, the Supreme Court or the Congress will find a
sound rule in the Arrott case and others of the same view.

Torts-Literary Property-Liability of Innocent Publisher of
Plagiarized Material-Plaintiff wrote a partly fictitious screen-play
on the life of Clara Barton. Defendant Brown plagiarized parts of the
plaintiff's play by incorporating some of the fictitious events and characters
into an unpublished book. Co-defendant Hearst Magazines Inc. published
extracts from defendant Brown's book in one of its magazines, entitling
them "High-Lights from a Forthcoming Biography. The Biography of
Clara Barton. By Beth Brown." This was done without knowledge of
the plagiarism. In an action to enjoin further use, to have an accounting,
and to recover damages, plaintiff was awarded a verdict against both
defendants on all counts. On appeal, held (2-I decision),' affirmed. A
publisher printing extracts from an unpublished book, which was a plagiarism, even though the publication was innocent, is nevertheless liable for2
damages. De Acosta v. Browm, 146 F. (2d) 4o8, (C. C. A. 2d, I944),
cert. denied, 13 U. S. L. WEEK 3449 (U. S. 1945).
8. See the B. T. A. citations in note 4 supra. Big Wolf Corp. v. Commissioner of
Int. Rev., 2 T. C. 751 (1943), while involving a mere recapitalization rather than a
merger, adopts the average cost rule as laid down in the Arrott case.
9. This rule uses as a basis for the new stock only the total capital invested by the
taxpayer.
io. This rule eliminates the possibility of a taxpayer's manipulating his stock
sales in such a manner as may decrease his tax in a given year. In a year when his
tax would otherwise be high, a taxpayer could sell new shares "identified" with high
price old shares and thereby produce a smaller gain or, perhaps, a loss.
ii. The court states: "It seems to us that the reasoning in Arrott v. Commissioner, . . . is erroneous and derives from a tangent of reasoning which the author
No doubt the books of the survivof that opinion mistakes for the main stem. . ..
ing corporation would show the exchange as all stock issued for all stock surrendered.
But the incident of the absorbing reorganization in its effect upon the corporation has
nothing directly to do with the problem here. It is the exact gain or loss where it is
ascertainable on an investment in stock that the law says must be the basis for his
tax." 148 F. (2d) 452, 456 (C. C. A. 9th, 1945). This "incident of the absorbing reorganization in its effect upon the corporation" would appear directly to bear on the problem by showing the cost of the new stock to the taxpayer to be the "quotient of the
cost of the old shares divided by the number of new shares received." Such quotient
is then the basis for determining the exact gain or loss.
12. "The average cost rule finds such firm support both from the Tax Court and
the various Circuits that it will take a Supreme Court decision or an Act of Congress
to change it." Arrott v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 136 F. (2d) 449, 451 (C. C. A.
3d, 1943).

i. Judge Hand dissented only to the liability of the Hearst Publishing Company,
on the grounds of its being an undesirable burden upon the freedom of the press.
2. The decision of the court as to the liability of defendant Hearst for damages is
the only issue of the case dealt with in this comment.
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The instant case presents the problem of two innocent parties, one of
whom must suffer. Practically, it would seem that the publisher is better
able to prevent the added harm that occurs to the author of a plagiarized
work by having it publicized. True, the author has a remedy against the
person who copied his work, but that remedy may, more often than not,
be worthless, since the copier is likely to be outside the jurisdiction, impecunious, or judgment-proof. Furthermore, it is conceivable that some
unscrupulous publisher might indirectly plagiarize an author's literary
accomplishments by means of a "straw" copier, thus insulating his liability
and depriving the author of any actual remedy. While it may be argued
that to impose liability on the publisher is, in effect, extending the modern
doctrine of absolute liability to cover infringement on literary property,
that is not necessarily a bad thing." The author of books or plays presents
himself to the public through his work. They divulge his life, his beliefs,
his personality, and his character. The very nature of man makes him
extremely interested in having work of his own creation legally protected
against infringement to the same extent that he is desirous of having his
name, reputation, and social position protected against defamation. It is
only natural from the standpoint of logic and experience that one who
innocently infringes upon another person's literary property should occupy
no better position in the eyes of the law than one who innocently publishes
defamation. It cannot be said to place an unduly oppressive burden on the
publishing house, for it is not imposing any stricter liability than is imposed
upon them for publishing defamatory statements; 4 and history shows that
this has not been unbearable, socially or economically. In turn, publishers have the ability to protect themselves by indemnification contracts
and by insurance.
The question presented in the instant case was squarely met in the
English case of Manmell v. Valley Printing Co.,5 the court deciding that
any person who, however innocently, published a pirated copy of an unpublished picture is liable for damages for infringing upon the owner's common
law right of property in the picture. 6 The question is now presented in the
United States as a matter of first impression. 7 Here is a publisher who is
engaging in business voluntarily and for his own profit. If he sees fit to
engage in this sort of business, there is no reason why he should not pay
the cost of an injury which is caused by that sort of business. The rule of
absolute liability is desirable in the cases of vicarious liability,8 Workmen's
Compensation, 9 and defamation.1 0 It is submitted that the court acted
wisely in holding that it is not unreasonable to force a publisher to ascertain whether a manuscript is a plagiarism, and that inability to do so is not
a defense.
3. For a general discussion of the developments of absolute liability see ELDREDGE,
Chapter II.
4. Publishers are held absolutely liable for unprivileged defamatory statements
appearing in their publications even though they did not intend the matter so published to be understood as defamatory, nor had reason to know that it might be considered defamatory. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) § 58o.
5. [19o8] 2 Ch. 44i.
6. The decision of the court was based on the reasoning that the author has an
incorporeal property right in his work which entitled him to prevent its publication by
others without his consent, and that the publisher gains no title, which justifies his
dealing with the property, from one who had no title to it.
7. Cf. American Press Association v. Daily Story Publishing Co., 12o Fed. 766
(C. C. A. 7th, i9o2) ; No-Leak-O Piston Ring Co. v. Norris, 277 Fed. 95I (C. C. A.
4th, 1921) : Haas v. Leo Feist, Inc., 234 Fed. IO5 (S. D. N. Y. I916).
8. PRossm, THE LAW OF TORTS (1941) 471 et .seq.
MODERN TORT PROBLEMS (1941)

9. Id. at 466 et seq.
iO. Id. at 816-7.
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Trusts-Inter Vivos Trust-Beneficiaries Named in Unsigned
Memorandum Found After Settlor's Death-Testator, who had an
insurance policy of which his estate was the beneficiary, executed a "request
for change of beneficiary," naming Rice as the new beneficiary of the policy
and reserving the right to make a further change. The testator by letter
notified Rice of this action, stipulating that he wished the proceeds of the
policy divided among five persons, namely Rice and four others whom he
would name in his will. The beneficiary replied that he would carry out
the testator's wishes, but the latter died without identifying the five-persons
in his will. Subsequently there was found among the testator's papers an
unsigned handwritten memorandum headed "to share insurance," listing
five persons including Rice. The executrix sued the insurance company to
secure the fund from the policy, whereupon Rice intervened, contending that
the proceeds should be awarded to him absolutely. The trial court gave
judgment for the executrix, holding that a resulting trust arose in favor of
the testator's estate. Rice appealed. Held, reversed and remanded. Such
a memorandum by the testator when taken together with the letter created
an express inter vivos trust for the benefit of the five persons named in the
memorandum. Jacknan, Rice intervenor, v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society of the United States, 145 F. (2d) 945 (C. C. A. 3d, 1944).
In order to analyze the holding of the instant case it is necessary to
take cognizance, as the court did, of the elementary requirements for the
creation of an inter vivos trust. The intent to impress a trust upon the
proceeds of the policy was clearly expressed in the testator's letter,' and
was further evidenced by the memorandum. With regard to the trust2
property, the insurance contract is concededly a definite subject matter.
It was the manner in which the beneficiaries were designated that gave rise
to the issue of the instant case. As Rice was named during the lifetime
of the settlor to be trustee of all the proceeds of the policy and beneficiary
of one-fifth of them, his right under an inter vivos trust should not be
affected by any allocation of the remaining four-fifths. And equally, considering that Rice agreed to hold the remainder of the proceeds on trust,
he cannot now be permitted to assert the rights of a sole beneficiary of the
policy. But since the insured did not name the other beneficiaries before
his death, it would appear that there could not be an inter vivos trust of
which they were the object. Such reasoning was followed by the trial
court. The case being decided upon Pennsylvania law,3 it is important
to note that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has ruled that the object of
a trust must be "ascertained." 4 The trial court, it would seem, properly
z. "The owner of the personal property may impress upon it a valid present trust,
either by a declaration that he holds the property in trust or by a transfer of the legal
title to a third party upon certain trusts." Dickerson's Appeal, 115 Pa. 198, 230 (1887).
No fixed form of declaration is required to create a trust, but sufficient facts must be
averred to show that the intention was plainly manifested. Smith's Estate, 144 Pa.
428, 22 Atl. 916 (i8gi).
2. Query, whether the settlor may create a trust in an insurance contract in which
the rights are vested in another person. Some courts have said the beneficiary has a
defeasible vested interest. Indiana Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, i8o Ind. 9, IOI
N. E. 289 (1913) ; Holder v. Prudential Ins. Co., 77 S. C. 299, 57 S. E. 853 (1907).
Yet in a Note (1928) 42 -ARv. L. Rav. 251, the writer states: "The insured may, however, reserve the right to change [the beneficiary] ; and in absence of facts establishing
an equity in his favor, the named beneficiary has then a mere expectancy which will
ripen into a vested interest only on the death of the insured." Mutual Benefit Life
Ins. Co. v. Sweet, 222 Fed. 20o (C. C. A. 6th, 1915). HuEum , LIFE IxsUTRANcE
(1925) 43. Both were cited as authority for the statement.
3. Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. n188 (3938).
4. Lawrence v. Godfrey, 296 Pa. 474, 146 Atl. iO7 (1929), in which the court
pointed out the three elements that must concur to create a trust.
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held that the beneficiaries, with the exception of Rice, were not an ascertained object, and that consequently no inter vivos trust was created with
respect to them, but rather that the insured's intent was to create a testamentary trust. Yet, since the unsigned memorandum could not qualify as
a testamentary instrument, an express trust on that ground would fail."
It is submitted that the Circuit Court of Appeals in reversing the judgment
fell into error by requiring that the beneficiaries of an inter vivos trust need
only be "identifiable." 6 Nor should the legatees in the will share the fourfifths, for the insured's act of changing the beneficiary made the will inoperative with regard to the policy. 7 Instead, the remaining four-fifths of the
proceeds should be held on a resulting trust for the estate.8
5.

§ 56.4.

RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS

(1935)

§ 56; I ScoTr, THE

LAW OF TRUSTS

(1939)

6. 145 F. (2d) 945, 949 (C. C. A. 3d, 1944). See also Frost v. Frost, 202 Mass.
ioo, 88 N. E. 446 (igog) ; Payton v. Almy, 17 R. I. 6o5 (1892).
7. In effect, the insurance policy was adeemed.
8. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) §411; 3 ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS (1939)
§ 411.2 and footnotes thereto.

